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new machines invented, was not taxable under the intangibles tax. The
payments were not derived from an "investment," but from a "contract of
employment."33 The fact that the employee could assign his right to payments was not controlling. The court said, however, it would decide the
question of the nature of the contract where payments were made to an
assignee when the question arose. Wren PaperCo. v. Gland&r established
the rule that federal securities owned by a corporation must be excluded
from the tax base formula m determining the corporate franchise tax.3Y
FRAKLIN C. LATcHAm

TORTS
Negligence
1.

Conduct of Parents'
In.a world teeming with small fry Hopalongs and juvenile violence it
seems appropriate to lead off with Whte v. Page.'
The petition in an action for personal injuries alleged that the defendants gave to and permitted their son, eleven years of age, to possess and
play with a bow and arrow; and that the son shot the arrow from the bow
at the plaintiff; and that the blunt end of the arrow struck the plaintiff's
eyeball. The bow and arrow were not described.
The court of appeals affirmed a judgment dismissing the action. "A
bow and arrow used by a child eleven years of age cannot be classed as a
dangerous instrumentality," the opinion said. Hence "other essential allegations are required to show a liability on the part of the parents."
Violation of Statute3
In Kay v. Pennsylvania R.R.4 the plaintiff, a brakeman, sitting atop
the side of a box car, was injured when his head struck a raised drawbridge,
built over the industrial track on which the car was traveling by a defendant,
the Orr Felt & Blanket Company. Raised, the bridge angled upward from a
hinge north of the track and cleared the nearer rail by seventeen and onehalf feet. The trial court charged that the violation of Sections 8903 and
8976-1 of the Ohio General Code was negligence per se. These sections
provide that, except in cases in which a designated state commission finds
2.

'For cases on liability of parent to child and of husband to wife see DOMESTIC RELATIONS article, supra.

2105 N.E.2d 652 (Ohio App. 1950).
See also material, infra, in TORTS article, under the following subheadings:
Licensees; ContributoryNegligence, Violation of Statute and Assured-Clear-Distance.
'61 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 102 N.E.2d 855 (Ohio App. 1951).
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it impracticable, bridges shall clear by at least twenty-one feet, vertically,
railroad tracks and the area to a certain distance beside each track.
Reversing a judgment against the Orr Felt & Blanket Company, the
court of appeals held that the trial court's instructions were erroneous since
these code provisions "do not lay down an absolute rule or duty"- each
of them empowering a commission to decide whether, in a given case, it is
impracticable to conform to the clearances specified.
When a motion for a limited rehearing was demed, a dissenting
opinion" said: "
The argument that there can be no specific requirement where the legislature authorizes exceptions by independent bodies is
not in harmony with the existing statutory law. For example- to crash
a traffic light showing 'red' is negligence per se. Surely it cannot be claimed
that such conduct is merely evidence of negligence because Sec. 6307-12
G.C., which requires obedience to the instructions of a traffic control device
contains the exception that permits one to disregard the traffic signal 'if
otherwise directed by a police officer."'
3.

Invitees
In Spitler v. Montgomeary Ward & Co." the petition alleged that the
plaintiff, a patron in the defendant's store, was injured as a proximate result of the defendant's negligence, in that the "defendant so waxed and
polished its floor as to allow it to become slippery in spots and not uniform
in its entirety." The petition was held to state a good cause of action by the
court of appeals, which reversed the judgment of the court below based on a
contrary theory.
4.

Social Guests
While refraining from "forcing a social guest" into the category of a
licensee, the supreme court stated in Scheibel v. LrptonT that a social guest
is not an invitee and that the land occupier owes him. a duty "short of that
owed to" an invitee.
The court said that the duty to a social guest is simply (1) to use ordinary care not to injure him by activities, and (2) to warn him of any
condition of the premises which is known to the host and which one in the
host's position should reasonably consider dangerous, if the host has reason
to believe that the guest does not know about and will not discover the
dangerous condition.
In the Scheibel case the defendants' home was set back some thirty feet
on their lot, north of the public sidewalk. Their driveway was along the
'Kay v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 Ohio L. Abs. 46, 102 N.E.2d 874 (Ohio App. 1951).

'60 Ohio L. Abs. 508, 102 N.E.2d 262 (Ohio
'156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453 (1951).

App. 1951).
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western edge of their property. The only walk to their front door was a
paved one that ran from the driveway, paralleled the house front, and led
to steps at the side of a platform just outside the front door. A hedge grew
along the south side of the platform. As the defendants knew, removing
a shrub had caused in their land, for several months, a "saucer shaped" hole,
about a yard wide and a foot deep. This was a couple of feet south of their
walk and a short way west of their steps. The plaintiff, a social guest
arrived at the defendants' home late in the evening. He was expected at that
time. It being his first visit, he was not acquainted with the premises. He
took a direct route over the lawn from the street to the front door. The
defendants were not home. Though it was very dark when they went away,
earlier that evening, the house was left without lights, except for a rear
room. The porch lights were not turned on. There were no other lights
nearby. Leaving, the plaintiff turned from the defendants' walk and started
over the lawn. Having no knowledge that the hole was there, he stepped
into it and thereby suffered serious physical injury.
A judgment for the plaintiff on a jury verdict was affirmed by the court
of appeals. The supreme court, however, gave final judgment for the defendants. The opinion said that there was no evidence of negligence to
submit to the jury; that the social guest could not expect more than such a
suitable, customary approach as the paved walk and driveway; that the
defendants could reasonably expect that the guest would use only this path;
that the whole involved no unreasonable risk under the circumstances.
Dissenting, two judges took the position that the defendants owed the
plaintiff the duty to use ordinary care for his safety, and that whether they
had done this was properly left to the jury.8
5.

Licensees
Told by a new acquaintance to meet him across the street on a parking
area ramp for an automobile ride, the plaintiff, in Moran v. Wehrung,9
crossed the street and climbed a ramp to a parking roof operated by the
defendant. Not finding his acquaintance and seeking cover from the rain,
the plaintiff ran to the end of the parking floor, stumbled over a umber
there, and was injured in a resultant tumble to the ground. The plaintiff
sued on the theory that the defendant failed to furnish him a place reasonably safe, as required by the "frequenter" statutes.10 It was claimed that the
defendant was negligent in not providing proper illumination or a proper
guard rail at the roof edge, and in the placement of timbers there.
Appealing from a judgment on a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff
'Id. at 332, 102 N.E.2d at 464.
'61 Ohio L. Abs. 212, 103 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio App. 1951).
" Omo GEN. CODE §§ 871-13, 871-15, 871-16.

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Spring

claimed that the trial court erred in refusing to apply the "frequenter"
statutes to the case. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment
The majority opinion stated that Ohio General Code Sections 871-15
and 871-16 "impose definite standards of conduct upon the proprietor or
owner of a place of employment to make his place
as free from dangers
for employees or frequenters as the nature of the employment will reasonably permit," and that Ohio General Code Section 871-13 (5) provides: 'The
term 'frequenter' shall mean and include every person, other than an employee, who may go in or be in a place of employment under circumstances
which render him other than a trespasser." The opinion reasoned, however, that the "frequenter" statutes were intended to apply only to workmen and invitees; that, in the Moran case, the plaintiff appeared at most a
bare licensee (for "if it may be said that the fortuitous circumstances creating a prospective relationship of guest and host brought into existence for
the prospective guest rights greater than those of a bare licensee when on the
premises upon which the host's car was parked,
in the case before us,
there is no evidence that the prospective host had parked his car in the
defendant's premises"), and that the defendant owed the plaintiff only the
duty not to "intentionally, wilfully, wantonly or through active negligence,
create pitfalls or hidden dangers, or cause such conditions to arise."
The dissenting judge stated that the language of the "frequenter" statutes is clear and excludes only a trespasser from their operation, and that
it could not be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff was a trespasser."
6.

Motor Vehicle Riders
m
Vest v. Krame
" was an action by a boy scout against the assistant
scoutmaster of his troop. According to the petition and opening statement,
the boy and the defendant were transporting waste paper for the troop's
benefit, by means of a two-wheeled trailer attached to an automobile; the
defendant was in immediate supervision; the boy, in helping, mounted and
dismounted from the trailer and rode thereon; and in trying to take his
place on the trailer while it was moving, he was injured through the defendant's negligent operation of the automobile and trailer.
The supreme court held that on these facts the boy was not a guest within the meaning of Section 6308-613 of the Ohio General Code. The court
therefore affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial
' Moran v. Wehrung, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 212, 217, 103 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ohio App.

1951).
158 Ohio St. 78, 107 N.E.2d 105 (1952)
"The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle
shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest
while being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle,
resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by
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court, which had given judgment for the defendant at the dose of the
plaintiff's opening statement.
The supreme court said, however: "A two-wheeled utility trailer
designed for and employed in general highway transportation and
attached to and operated as a unit with an automobile which provides the
operative power
is a motor vehicle within the meaning of subdivision 2
of Section 6290,'1 General Code."
The writer of the dissenting opinion S- in which two other judges
concurred -reasoned that, under Section 6308-6, if the owner or operator
of a motor vehicle is to be held liable for merely negligent injury to one
that he permits to ride on the vehicle, the rider has the burden of alleging
and proving that he was not being transported without payment therefore;
and here there were no allegations or statements to justify inferring that
the "defendant received or expected
any pecuniary or material benefit for
his motor vehicle or for his services.
Supplier of Chattel"0
Witherspoon v.Haft 7 was an action for personal injuries caused by the
plaintiff's falling from the top row of temporary bleachers while viewing, as
an invitee, a night football game on a school's premises. Under a rental
agreement the school had temporary possession and control of the stands.
There was evidence that, besides owning the bleachers and reserving the
right to supervise erecting them, the defendants had in fact erected them.
They "had extensive experience and familiarity" with such bleachers. They
knew the stands would be used at "a crowded night game within a few
hours after their erection and that there would probably be no time for the
school authorities to take any steps
to guard against such a hazard" as
caused the plaintiff's fall.
The top row of seats in the bleachers was made up of boards, nine to
ten feet above the ground. The "boards rested in U-shaped
brackets,
equal to the width of the seat boards, and having perpendicular
7.

the wilful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner or person responsible for
the operation of said motor vehicle."
"'Motor vehicle' means any vehicle propelled or drawn by power other than
muscular power or power collected from overhead trolley wires, except road rollers,
traction engines, power shovels, power cranes and other equipment used in construction work and not designed for or employed in general highway transportation,
well drilling machinery, ditch digging machinery, farm machinery, threshing machinery, hay bailing machinery and agricultural tractors and machinery used in the
production of horticultural, agricultural and vegetable products."
'Vest v. Kramer, 158 Ohio St. 78, 92, 107 N.E.2d 105, 112 (1952).
For liability of sellers of goods see supra, in SALEs article, material under subheading Warrantoes.
T 157 Ohio St. 474, 106 N.E.2d 296 (1952).
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sides of approximately one inch in height for
holding the seat boards in
place. The seat brackets were
screwed to wooden risers" based on the
ground. Thickness of the seat boards was an inch to an inch and a half.
"The risers were about four feet apart. Each seat board extended across
four risers and overlapped the adjacent seat board," by a foot, where "the
two boards rested on a common seat bracket
There were no damps or
other devices to hold the seat boards in place."
Because of the overlap, the U-bracket could not prevent the seat board
on which the plaintiff sat from being pushed back. As the crowd suddenly
jumped to its feet to view an exciting play, "this seat board was pushed
backward, thereby removing anything to prevent" the plaintiff "from falling
backwards to the ground." So the plaintiff fell.
The defendants had judgment on a directed verdict. The court of appeals
reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial."'
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The
court held that the defendants owed an invitee of the school the duty of
ordinary care in furnishing and erecting the bleachers; that they could be
found negligent since the seat board on which the plaintiff sat was not
securely fixed; and that "where the evidence justifies findings, that the occupier of [the] premises did not know of the hazard
and
did not have
a reasonable opportunity to learn of or guard against such hazard, the voluntary conduct of the occupier of the premises in inviting spectators to
use such bleachers will not as a matter of law break the chain of proximate
causation which may otherwise exist between an injury to such spectator
resulting from such hazard and the negligence of those who
furnished
and constructed such bleachers."
A dissenting opimon"9 said: "
The lessee or bailee accepted management and control of the bleachers with their obvious
quality as to
safety, assumed responsibility for their condition and use and thereby relieved the lessors or bailors from responsibility to it and its invitees."
Contributory Negligence
1. Violation of Statute"
The supreme court decided in Perry v. Baskey' that "Section 630748(b), General Code, providing that, where usable walks or paths parallel
to a street or highway are not provided, pedestrians may walk along or upon
the traveled portion of such street or highway and where practicable shall
"Witherspoon v. Haft, 61 Ohio L Abs. 102, 103 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio App. 1951).
"Witherspoon v. Haft, 157 Ohio St. 474, 486, 106 N.E.2d 296, 303 (1952).
2
*See also material in TORTS article under the following subheadings: snfra, Assured-Clear-Distance; and, supra, Negligence, Violation of Statute and Licensees.
' 158 Ohio St. 151, 107 N.E.2d 328 (1952).
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face the approaching traffic and shall exercise due care to avoid approaching
traffic, prescribes a rule of conduct and is not a specific requirement, and it

is prejudicial error for a trial court to charge the jury that a pedestrian who
walks along or upon a highway with the traffic and not against it is chargeable with negligence as a matter of law."
The trial court had so charged in a personal injury action in which the
plaintiff's evidence was that he was stepping westward along the berm immediately to the north of the highway pavement when an automobile
operated by the defendant hit him from behind.
The court of appeals reversed a judgment on a verdict for the defendant
and ordered a new trial on the ground that the instruction was erroneous.
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.
22
The Perry case should be compared with Bush v.Harvey Transfer Co.
2.

Assured-Clear-Distance
McFaddenv.Elmer C. Breuer TransportatonCo. 23 a roll of steel, about
four feet in diameter and thirty-four inches high, fell, after dark, from the
defendants southbound truck into the northbound traffic lane of the highway. An automobile operated by the plaintiffs decedent, traveling north
on the highway, struck the roll. As a result, the decedent was killed. In a
wrongful death action based upon these occurrences, the defendant stipulated that its negligence proximately caused the death, but argued that the
decedent was guilty of contributory negligence in violating the assureddear-distance-ahead rule.2 Evidence regarding the discernibility of the
roll was conflicting.
After a trial to the court the plaintiff had judgment. On the ground
that the collision had been proved and that the plaintiff had not sustained
the burden of showing that it was impossible for the decedent to comply
with the assured-clear-distance statute, the court of appeals reversed, and
gave the defendant final judgment.
Affirming the judgment of the common pleas court, the supreme court
Jield that, having presented no evidence that the steel "appeared in the
path of the automobile a sufficient distance ahead ... to have given the operator time, in the exercise of ordinary care, to stop and avoid the collision," the
defendant did not sustain its burden of proof.
The opinion reasoned that since the defendant had the-burden of proving contributory negligence, the defendant had the burden of presenting
22146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851 (1946).
' 156 Ohio St. 430, 103 N.E.2d 385 (1952).
'OHIO GEN. CODE 1 6307-21. "
No person

shal drive any motor vehide

in and upon any street or highway at a greater speed than will, permit him to bring
it to a stop within the assured dear distance ahead."
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evidence "upon each element necessary to -conatitute a violation" of the
assured-clear-distance statute.
The opinion also stated: "Had it been necessary for the trial court to
consider
whether the roll.of steel was a reasonably discernible object,
the court would have had a jury question to decide."
3.

Proximate Cause
Doubts that the issue of contributory negligence as a proximate cause
of injury could ever be other than a jury question were dispelled in Ziebro v.
25
CMeland.
This was an action for death resulting from the plaintiff's decedent
being struck by the defendant's negligently operated streetcar. The plaintif's decedent looked toward the fully lighted car, which was some 275
feet away and approaching him at an estimated fifty-one to fifty-nine feet
a second. He then started hurriedly to walk across the street on which the
car was moving. He was well acquainted with the physical conditions at
his crossing place. No explanation of his presence in the path of the car
when struck was offered.
The plaintiff had judgment in the trial court. In the court of appeals,
two judges thought that the jury's failing to find that the decedents negligence was a proximate cause of his death was dearly against the weight of
the evidence. The third judge disagreed. So the judgment was affirmed.
The two agreeing judges considered themselves precluded from holding
that, as a matter of law, the decedent's negligence was a proximate cause
of his death, since the supreme court had decided that "in cases of this nature
the issue of proximate cause is a jury question." 26
The supreme court reversed the trial court's judgment and entered final
judgment for the defendant. The court held: "
Where, giving
the
Plaintiff's evidence the most favorable interpretation in favor of the absence of negligence on his part, such evidence
is susceptible of no other
reasonable inference than that of negligence on his part,
proximately
contributing to his injury,
it is the duty of the court
to direct a ver2T
dict for the defendant."
Assumption of Risk
"Where a person purchases a reserved seat in an unscreened section of
a hockey arena from the proprietor thereof, is escorted to such seat by an
' 157 Ohio St. 489, 106 N.E.2d 161 (1952).
"The court cited Smith v. Zone Cabs, 135 Ohio St. 415, 21 N.E.2d 336 (1939);
Glasco v. Mendelman, 143 Ohio St. 649, 56 N.E.2d 210 (1944); and Betras v.
G.M. McKelvey Co., 148 Ohio St. 523, 76 N.E.2d 280 (1947).
= The court approved and followed Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St.Louis Ry.
Co. v. Lee, Adm'r., 111 Ohio St. 391, 145 N.E. 843 (1924)
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agent of the proprietor, knows nothing about the game of hockey, has never
witnessed one or heard one described, and has never seen a flying puck,
such person, in the absence of any warning does not as a matter of law
assume the risk of being hit by a puck flying from the arena during the
game," the supreme court held in Morrs v. Clkveland Hockey Club, Izc.28
The court reasoned that "the dangers to spectators incident to attending
a hockey game .. are not . matters of common knowledge or so obvious,
that a person of ordinary prudence would necessarily have knowledge of
them."
The defendant had provided screens protecting a third of the seats in
its hockey arena. The plaintiff, when struck and injured by a puck lofted
by a player's stck, was in an unscreened sea, about five feet behind the rink
sideboards (three and a half to four feet high) and three and a half feet
higher than the ice. No puck had come into the seating area as the game
proceeded before this mishap.
Overruling the defendant's motions for a directed verdict, the trial court
left the questions of negligence, contributory negligence and assumption of
risk to the jury. It denied written requests for charges that sports patrons
assume the risk of hazards to spectators normally inherent in the sport,
and that the management performs its duty of care in screening when it
provides some screened seats and gives the patrons the opportunity to sit
in them. Judgment was entered on a verdict for the plaintiff. Motions
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were overruled. The court of appeals29 affirmed the judgment-and properly,
the supreme court decided.
Defamation
Interpretation of Words
In Johnson v. Campbell30 the petition alleged that the defendants published in writing the false statement that the plaintiff was dismissed from
their employment because she was "disloyal," and, later, the false statement
that the plaintiff was "disloyal to us her employers."
The court of appeals held that the trial court properly sustained a demurrer to the petition, for "a simple statement that a person is disloyal in
connection with his employment is not libelous per se." The court said:
"Words susceptible of interpretation as innocent in significance are not
actionable per se, and under such circumstances to set forth a cause of action
for libel it is necessary to allege extrinsic facts by way of inducement, innu1.

"157 Ohio St. 225, 105 N.E.2d 419 (1952).

See 4 WsT RES. L. Ruv. 180

(1952).

' Morns v. Cleveland Hockey Club, Inc., 59 Ohio L Abs. 145, 98 N.E.2d 49 (Obo
App. 1951).
" 108 N.E.2d 749 (Ohio App. 1952).

